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  ABSTRACT 
 
Until the end of the 1990s, Nicaragua was marked with social conflict and internal 
political struggles. From 2000 until 2006 Nicaragua experienced a relatively democratic period, 
in which the country drafted Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) with participation of 
the civil society. In this period, the openness of the political system and the participatory 
dimension of the PRSPs helped to strengthen civil society and increase policy influencing. As a 
result a shift took place away from service delivery and towards more lobbying and advocacy. 
The election of Ortega in 2006 (Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)) as president 
introduced the shrinking of this democratic space. From that moment onwards, donors 
encountered difficulties in dealing with the participation conditionality. At the same time, civil 
society organizations (CSOs) found it difficult to counterbalance the increasing undemocratic 
tendencies despite their efforts to organize mobilizations. This paper argues that the NAA, 
which pushes civil society into the watchdog role, is rather troublesome in contexts which are 
politically closing down. Imposing the single role of watchdog on civil society is ineffective. The 
NAA should not be treated as a rigid blueprint but, rather, as a guideline for policy 
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  RESUMEN 
 
A finales de los 90, Nicaragua era un país marcado por el conflicto social y por los 
enfrentamientos políticos internos. Entre 2000-2006, Nicaragua experimentó un periodo 
relativamente democrático bajo el cual tubo lugar la formulación de las Estrategias de 
Reducción de la Pobreza (ERP), estableciéndose así la nueva arquitectura de la ayuda 
internacional. La apertura del sistema político y la dimensión de la participación que implicaba 
la ERP ayudó a fortalecer la sociedad civil y a aumentar su influencia política. Esto resultó en 
un cambio del rol de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil pasando de ser meramente 
proveedores de servicies a asumir roles de influencia política y cabildeo. La elección de Ortega 
en 2006 (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional  -  FSLN) como presidente conllevó una 
reducción del espacio democrático. Desde entonces, los donantes han experimentado 
dificultades a la hora de implementar la nueva arquitectura de la ayuda internacional. Al mismo 
tiempo, las organizaciones de la sociedad civil difícilmente se han podido contraponer a las 
crecientes tendencias no democráticas, a pesar de sus esfuerzos en movilizarse. La nueva 
arquitectura de la ayuda internacional, bajo la cual se espera que la sociedad civil juegue el rol 
de “watchdog”,  parece presentar problemas en contextos donde los espacios políticos de 
participación se están cerrando. Pues, la nueva arquitectura de la ayuda internacional no 
debería tomarse como una “receta”,  sino que como una guía para la implementación, teniendo 
en cuenta el contexto y la situación del país.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
During the last ten years, a new aid architecture has emerged and firmly taken root 
in a large part of the donor community. One of the linchpins of this new aid approach were the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Governments in developing countries that wished 
to receive concessional assistance, debt relief, and additional aid from donors were expected to 
draft such a poverty reduction strategy and hold consultations with civil society organizations 
(CSO). Although PRSPs as a concept have lost momentum and more localized names have 
surfaced in the mean time, its principles remain the same: it is all about being a long term, 
comprehensive and results-oriented poverty reduction strategy, with national governments in 
the driver’s seat.  
 
The role and place of participation in the PRSP design was quite remarkable. 
Governments were expected to carry out consultations with stakeholders during the drafting 
process of PRSPs. Although participation was mandatory, it was not strictly evaluated by the 
International Financial Institutions staff, as these are not allowed to make political assessments. 
Participation evolved thus into a kind of “soft” conditionality. Especially in the first five to six 
years participation was perceived to be one of the cornerstones of the New Aid Approach 
(NAA), and civil society was recognized as a “development partner” (OECD/DAC 2005; World 
Bank 2007; Paris Declaration 2005; OECD 2007). It was intended that civil society would be 
involved throughout the whole cycle of policy making, including –  and especially –  the 
monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of PRSPs. While doing so, civil society was 
expected to carry out two roles: (1) a developmental role, (2) a democratizing role. The first role 
was linked to the promotion of pro-poor interests, the second one to voice and accountability. 
Both roles were also considered central in building broad based ownership around the country’s 
poverty reduction agenda. Important to mention is the strong pressure on NGOs to move away 
from service delivery, away from replacing the state, towards more watchdog, lobbying and 
advocacy roles. As Cornwall and Gaventa (2000) rightly state, CSOs are expected to shift from 
micro to macro, from projects to policies, from beneficiaries to citizens. Figure 1 summarizes the 
expected roles of civil society under the PRSP.  
 
Figure 1: the expected Role of Participation in the PRSP-philosophy 
 
                                         (broad based) ownership       
Civil society participation     pro-poor effectiveness            poverty reduction  
                                         accountability                           
                                                                    democracy 
Source: Molenaers & Renard (2006:8) 
 
But what happens with this one-size-fits-all model when the political context 
gradually moves from quite open and democratic towards more undemocratic? How does civil 
society deal with externally imposed roles and participation schemes that do not at all times fit 
internal political dynamics? This paper sets out to describe how these changing political 
dynamics largely define the roles which can be taken up by civil society and argues that moving 
or sticking to service delivery may well be the only strategy CSOs have if they want to survive in 
a politically hostile environment.   
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From 2000 until 2006 Nicaragua went through a relatively democratic period, in 
which it was relatively easy to realize the participation conditionality linked to the PRSP. Those 
years saw the opening up of different windows of opportunity to strengthen civil society and 
enable policy influencing, whereby actively increasing a watchdog role and moving away from 
service delivery. However, when democratic space started to shrink under the presidency of 
Ortega and Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 2006, it became increasingly difficult 
to live up to the participation conditionality. At the same time, CSOs found difficulties to 
counterbalance the increasing undemocratic tendencies despite their efforts to organize 
mobilizations and form coalitions.  
 
Carried out in 2008, this qualitative study combines one month of fieldwork and 
desk research. 21 representatives from different organizations were interviewed during the 
fieldwork: 10 local CSOs (movements, NGOs, trade unions), 4 donors, 5 INGOs, and 2 experts.  
 
This paper consists of the following: the next section reviews literature on civil 
society roles in development and democratization. In addition, it focuses on how these separate 
roles have gradually come together under the umbrella of the NAA. Section three analyses the 
roles of civil society under different regimes since the end of Somoza’s dictatorship up until the 
present Ortega’s rule. A special emphasis is given to civil society in both PRSPs and Ortega’s 
administration. Section four draws on the donors’ support and responses to civil society after 
the introduction of NAA and their implications for CSOs. Finally, a set of conclusions points out 
that context matters. The authors demonstrate that blueprints or models for civil society do not 
work and it is therefore imperative to have a strong understanding of political context so as to 
prevent jeopardizing civil society from fulfilling its commitment to contribute to aid effectiveness 
agenda.  
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2.  CIVIL SOCIETY: MOTOR OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY? A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Under the NAA, CSOs are the source for both increasing development 
effectiveness and pushing for democratization process. The logic behind this dates back to 
insights relating to the roles CSOs have played in recent history. 
 
2.1.  Civil society as a developmental actor 
 
Strengthening civil society participation in development cooperation has been an 
issue on the donor agenda, especially since the era of the SAPs (Structural Adjustment 
Programmes) during the 1980s. The SAPs introduced political and economic reforms, such as 
liberalization of markets, the privatization of services, decentralization of political and economic 
power. This implied the subsequent rollback of the state and the opportunity for CSOs to 
strongly step into the provision of services. NGOs, in particular, were seen as an alternative to 
governments to deliver services such as education, health, microfinance, etc. Regarded as 
more cost-effective, people-oriented, better skilled, less bureaucratic and thus closer to the 
poor, NGOs were thought to be well placed to impact development (Edwards & Hume 1998; 
Mitlin et al. 2007). NGOs also featured innovation, flexibility and participation (Gaventa & 
Cornwall 1999; Fowler 2000). Participatory approaches therefore proliferated strongly and 
CSOs launched their own projects and programmes instead of joining in within wider political 
communities (Hickey & Mohan 2005). The latter began to be seen as a problem during the 
nineties, however. By and large, the SAPs themselves failed in substantial ways: the imposed 
reforms were, more often than not, not implemented by the recipient government, the rolling 
back of the state had not brought an end to corruption, inefficiency, rent-seeking, the absence of 
rule of law, etc. It became obvious that reform cannot be bought, that it has to come from within. 
At the same time, it was acknowledged that NGO-led service delivery did not produce satisfying 
results: creating islands of performance did not spill over into broader governance 
improvements. The need for good governance on the one hand, and the potential role of civil 
society in pushing the governance agenda on the other became increasingly for improved state 
performance. They viewed civil society as “a benign arena” to check on “the malign state” 
whereby giving rise to CSOs as key actors who can improve governance (Howell & Pearce 
2001:41).  
  
2.2.  Civil society as a democratizing actor 
 
Civil society as a democratizing actor plays a significant role in the political and 
social discourse. It is closely related to political changes achieved by various movements and 
grassroots’ organizations in Latin America and eastern European countries. At the end of the 
1970s CSOs in countries, such as Argentina, Chile and Nicaragua, led struggles against 
repressive governments and were central in ousting dictatorships (White 1994). A decade later, 
civil society organizations in eastern European countries, e.g. Solidarity in Poland and other 
movements in former Czechoslovakia that advocated the dissolution of the Soviet Union, were 
influential in forging a vision of civil society as a source for regime change (ibid.). Yet, the role of 
civil society was not limited to the level of regime change alone. NGOs, trade unions, students’ 
organizations and religious groups, taken together, represented democratic consolidation once 
a democratic system was established (Mercer 2002; Diamond 1994). Ultimately, these events  
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and the ensuing geopolitical context after the fall of the Berlin wall provided enough space and 
clout for donors to include democratization in their development policies and programmes.   
 
Putnam (1993) in his book Making Democracy Work, analyzes the nature of the 
relationship between social capital and democracy emphasizing that social capital generates 
community sense which subsequently facilitates democratic transition and consolidation. On the 
one hand, social capital encourages feelings of common interest that lead to social 
organization. In turn, social organization helps channel the demands and interests of citizens to 
the state as well as serves the mobilizing role for political pressure by challenging non-
democratic regimes and pushing towards democracy. On the other hand, once democracy is 
established, social capital expands the capacity of citizens to access information, political ideas 
and public participation as well as empowers them to demand state responsiveness whereby 
increasing both government accountability and transparency eventually leading to democratic 
consolidation.  
 
For the reasons stated above, CSOs started to be considered to encourage social 
trust, civic engagement, democratic attributes and articulate interests consistent with regime 
change and democratic consolidation (Diamond 1994). Moreover, donors felt encouraged to 
fund programmes aimed at democracy building, attaching to civil society the virtues of playing 
roles to enhance democratic transition and good governance. 
 
 2.3.  Which roles for civil society under the new aid approach? 
 
The NAA considers the state to be central in providing development. Rather than 
bullying the state into reform (as in the period of the SAPs), engaging with the government in 
undertaking those reforms over which they have ownership is to be preferred. Therefore new 
aid delivery modalities such as general or sector budget support and pooled funds which 
directly support the government have been created in order to give more room to ownership, to 
align with government systems, to improve donor harmonization and to allow for a more result-
oriented approach to poverty reduction. Donors bring in CSOs because these organizations can 
communicate the needs of the poor and be influential in participatory processes, securing the 
design of effective policies (Stiglitz 2002; Molenaers & Renard 2006). CSOs are expected to 
monitor government policies, public expenditure and demand accountability. Doing so, they can 
reduce rent-seeking and enhance economic performance through promoting transparent and 
democratic practices and consequently counterbalance state power (Hadenius & Uggla 1996; 
Fowler 2000).  
The line of reasoning behind the relationship of civil society, democracy and 
development under the NAA stems from a liberal definition of civil society and therefore reflects 
neoliberal values (Mercer 2002; Bebbington et al. 2008). Based on the theories of 
modernization and political development schools, democracy has been looked at as the best 
regime not only for ethical and redistributive reasons (Bhagwati 2002), but also for the 
development of capitalism (Stiglitz 2002). Capitalist societies require a strong and autonomous 
civil society (Howell & Pearce 2001; Mercer 2002; Stiglitz 2002) to “check and balance” the 
excess of state power and control the political institutions to enhance good governance (Fowler 
2000; Mercer 2002; Boussard 2002). Moreover, its impact is also extended to the economic 
sphere contributing to transparency, institutional quality, effective law and regulations, 
decreasing rent-seeking and improving investment climate (Stiglitz 2002).  
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From the point of view of liberal democratic theory, widely advocated by such 
authors as Alexis de Tocqueville, Samuel Huntington, Robert Putnam, and others, civil society 
can only be conceived in its relations with the state. Added to this, civil society and state 
constitute separate spheres that each complement one another. In fact, civil society under the 
NAA can be understood as a constellation of associations that are embedded in the spheres 
situated between state, market and family. In this setup, the issues of public concern are 
negotiated and at the same time common objectives (so-called “public good” whose activities 
are organized in a collective way) are pursued (OECD 2007). Aside from NGOs, this broad 
definition of civil society includes grassroots organizations, trade unions, movements and the 
like, solving in this way, the “bias” in the development field of identifying civil society with NGOs 
(ibid.).  
 
Voice and accountability, endowed to civil society, indicate specific qualities CSOs 
possess and are therefore expected to make use of under the NAA, namely strive towards 
broad-based ownership, pro-poor effectiveness and accountability with the aim to achieve 
democracy and development (Molenaers & Renard 2006). This is to assume on the one hand 
that CSOs work closely with the poor to empower them, accumulate technical skills as well as 
expertise. On the other hand, CSOs are independent, people-centered actors driven by 
democratic values and goals who aim at representing the excluded segments of society. 
 
2.3.  Realistic approach for civil society in development cooperation? 
 
Although the new aid paradigm has resulted in an unprecedented scaling-up of 
participatory approaches rendering civil society access to political process, so far very little 
evidence regarding its democratic and developmental impact exists. Different authors and 
studies have questioned the virtues attributed to civil society, pointing out the main deficiencies 
and problems in developing countries. It has been argued that most CSOs involved in PRSP 
processes consist of urban professional organizations with limited or no links with grassroots 
organizations. Their capacities for innovation, flexibility and cost-effectiveness are not 
automatically ensured (Fowler 2000; Hickey & Bracking 2005). They do not necessarily have 
democratic values or a democratic structure; they are shaped by ethnic and political cleavages; 
they do not necessarily escape traditional norms and patterns of authority (Hadenius & Uggla 
1996:1625), nor are they automatically able to overcome clientelistic practices. They tend to be 
mainly accountable to donors, government, and trustees while  downward accountability 
towards beneficiaries and/or members and capacity to build long term alliances remains weak 
(Fowler 2000; Boussard 2002; Mercer 2002; Molenaers & Renard 2006). All considered, there 
is no guarantee that civil society will represent and bring the interest of the poor to the forefront 
of policies and hold governments accountable. By the same token, the liberal worldview does 
recognize that civil society can have a counterproductive impact on democratic consolidation 
(Diamond in Mercer 2002:8).  
The problem with the NAA is that it does not problematize the concept of civil 
society. Civil society is considered a priori as playing a positive role while CSOs are not 
homogenous, but heterogeneous actors that do not represent one set of interests and therefore 
are prone to conflict. In fact, civil society is made up of a myriad of organizations including 
movements, NGOs, grass roots organizations, trade unions with different value-based ideas 
(Thomas in Bebbington et al. 2008) shaped by political dynamics and power relations  and 
structures as well as by hostility and loyalty amongst CSOs and between CSOs and the state. 
NGOs strive to address development taking approaches of “small is beautiful” (Schumacher),  
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“people-centered development” or “participatory rural appraisal and power reversals” (Thomas 
in Bebbington et al. 2008). Created to defend mutual interests, the benefits of their members or 
for the public benefit operating at a small scale and in specific areas (Mercer 2002; Thomas in 
Bebbington et al. 2008), such organizations are not necessarily democratic. And, although they 
share political and economic goals, conceptual, political and organizational tensions are present 
(Bendaña 2006). Therefore, it is not certain whether civil society will advance the interests of the 
poor. 
 
Moreover, as stressed by Hadenius and Uggla, civil society is “a relational concept” 
and for this reason defined by “its relations among actors of CSOs and them and the state” 
(1996:1627). Whether an enhanced voice will contribute to accountability in nondemocratic 
contexts is contingent both on state responsiveness and the agents of change who will voice 
the needs of the poor. Complexity, diversity, power relations and context attached to civil 
society yet have to be addressed in the present NAA. If  not, this might weaken voice and 
accountability, the pivotal elements to counterbalance state abuses and lead to undermining 
mutual understanding and alliances necessary for generating political and social change 
(Renshaw in Hadenius & Uggla 1996).  
 
Some  postulate development will be achieved by promoting democratic 
governance with civil society serving as a “magic bullet” that will enable a democratic behavior 
for achieving development. However, this link is weak. There is not enough evidence to prove 
that democracy has a positive (or negative) impact on development. NAA, however, assumes to 
deal with civil society as a unique and homogenous entity at the same time turning a deaf ear to 
the internal dynamics of CSOs and their relations with the state.  
 
In undemocratic contexts, where participation spaces are limited, especially in 
developing countries, CSOs might face significant challenges to uphold democratic rules and 
play according to the NAA. To treat CSOs as a homogenous group of actors would be too 
farfetched and even dangerous. Even so, holding civil society to be a key for democratization 
and development and compelling it to assume roles within a political arena in a given context 
can do harm rather than support in democratization and development.  
 
Nicaragua makes an interesting case for analyzing civil society considering the 
struggles and intense, even conflictual relations among CSOs as well as the state. CSOs in 
Nicaragua have shown to be effective in removing a dictator out of power (Somoza). CSOs 
have also become good partners working in conjunction with the state, effective service 
providers as well as the beacon of raising voice and accountability. However, under the 
Ortega’s presidency, marked by an undemocratic rule, CSOs seem not to be able to 
counterbalance state abuses any more. One could argue that the incapacity to face the present 
context and keep up certain levels of democratic rule is due to the cleavage within the left 
created by the FSLN holding the power and between supporters and opponents of the 
executive government (Borchgrevink 2006). This study shows that a lack of power to confront 
the present context goes farther than that. It has also to do with the different roles assumed by 
organizations, their particular interests, fragmentation, the politico-economic context, power 
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3.  THE NICARAGUAN CASE: POLITICAL DYNAMICS, CIVIL SOCIETY 
ROLES AND DONOR RESPONSES 
 
3.1  From Somoza to Ortega: from political roles to developmental roles 
 
Nicaraguan history shows that large segments of civil society have been willing 
and able to play developmental as well as democratic roles. Nicaragua endured the repressive 
Somoza dictatorship for 45 years (1934-1979). This context did not favor the existence of an 
autonomous and vibrant civil society. In fact, Nicaraguan civil society was caught between the 
Somocista state and the anti-Somocista parties (Prado 2007). Most organizations were 
considered loyal to regime while other were co-opted by the dictatorship whereby serving as its 
social basis and regime legitimacy (Quirós 2006; Borchgrevink 2006). Nevertheless, resistance 
organizations existed in the regime’s shadows despite the repression exercised over any 
attempt to create opposition.  
 
It was not until the 1970s that Nicaraguan civil society proved to be an effective 
force against authoritarian tendencies. A widespread discontent within society, especially after 
the earthquake in 1972, reinforced the existing organizations and enhanced the creation of new 
ones. NGOs, movements and parties formed a broad anti-Somoza coalition with radical social 
bases aimed at political mobilization against the regime. Although political spaces were 
completely closed, civil society actors carried out limited, but strong and effective actions to hold 
the government accountable (Prado 2007; Quiros 2006). One of the most important 
achievements in the history of Nicaraguan civil society was bringing down the repressive 
Somoza dictatorship through a massive popular mobilization and wide civil society coalition led 




, CSOs in Nicaragua showed they were central to challenge non-democratic 
regimes and promote change.  
With the FSLN party in power, space for associational life increased substantially 
offering strong incentives and commitment to work with and for the poor
2, especially in rural 
areas. New NGOs were established, some of them ideologically closer to the Sandinistas than 
others, especially trade unions, women and farmer’s movements
3  blossomed in the early 
phases of the regime (Quirós 2006; Borchgrevink 2006). Equally important, the revolution 
enabled the expansion of most of the NGOs’ activities. INGOs increasingly stepped in providing 
financial support to local mass organizations and NGOs
4
 
. Civil society, together with these 
INGOs mainly carried out service delivery activities, such as handing out microcredit, providing 
education, health and production services (Borchgrevink 2006).  
However, Nicaragua did not escape the impact from the Cold War. The FSLN grew 
radical; the contra war, financed by the USA, was waged to undermine the Sandinista regime. 
Effectively, an even deepening cleavage between  the political left and right, between the 
                                                           
1 Argentina (1983), Brazil (1984), Chile (1989). 
2 In less than 5 years illiteracy rate of 50.35% could be reduced by 37.39 percentage points to 12.96% 
(Hanemann 2005). At: 
http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/files/43487/11315380511Hanemann_U.doc/Hanemann_U.doc (last 
consulted: July 26, 2010).  
3 For example, AMNLAE (women’s organization), ATC (farm workers), FETSALUD (Sandinista union of 
health workers).  
4 120 INGOs were active during the period (Borchgrevink 2006:19).  
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supporters of the Sandinistas and those of anti-Sandinistas emerged. Mass organizations, often 
based on a top-down logic, were increasingly co-opted by the Sandinista leaders (Prado 2007). 
Organizations played a fundamental political role keeping the spirit of the revolution, staunchly 
subordinating to the party and, in turn, to the government instead of being accountable to their 
constituents and defending their interests (Borchgrevink 2006). Consequently, internal spaces 
for voice and accountability were systematically sealed off; organizations were instrumentalized 
to serve ideological purposes of the dominant party. Even though civil society could not fulfill its 
democratic roles, it could, however, execute developmental roles at the local level.  
 
3.2.  Democratic transition and neoliberal policies: voice on the rise 
 
In 1990 the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent advance of 
democracy compelled the Sandinistas to organize the first free and fair elections in the country. 
However, these elections signaled the end of the regime. As a result, Nicaragua entered  a 
neoliberal phase receiving considerable support in the form of development aid from bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation. The introduction of neoliberal policies, structural adjustment, 
privatization and decentralization of economic power was initiated by the Chamorro’s 
administration and was embraced by successor governments subsequently. Naturally, this 
prompted a rollback of the state, the establishment of a legal framework that promoted a 
considerable proliferation of nongovernmental forms of association and led to an eventual 
increase of the role of civil society as a resource channel and service provider. The number of 
NGOs started booming. Especially qualified people from the former Sandinista government 
seized this opportunity to start up new NGOs, not only to ensure their professional careers, but 
also to sustain the ideals of the revolution, to criticize the neo-liberal agenda and to continue 
working with disadvantaged groups. At the same time civic education and human rights 
organizations financed by USAID sprang up, some with clear links to rightwing political parties 
(Quiros 2006). All these opportunities materialized in the ngo-ization of Nicaraguan civil society 
(Borchgrevink 2006; Prado 2007) signifying the first steps towards an independent and vibrant 
civil society (Borchgrevink 2006; Prado 2008).  
 
The decentralization and withdrawal of the state heralded active civil society 
participation in public services provision too. The legal framework enabled civic participation 
and establishment of organizations/associations at all levels (1992)
5
 
 and attenuated political 
obstacles for civil society. The role of holding governments in check rooted strongly among new 
organizations. Lobby activities sprang up too (Prado 2007). The only organizations that were 
losing out were the organizations from the past, typically mass organizations formerly linked to 
the Sandinista party, because they lost their privileged relation with the state hence they lost 
their political dominance. During the 1990s, internal struggles within the FSLN affected the 
allied mass movements, trade unions and other CSOs. Some organizations broke off their 
political links with the party, others became very active in opposing the government. The 
nineties were marked with constant social conflict as demands from CSOs mounted 
considerably. Armed actions, demonstrations, land seizures were common. However, the 
situation started improving at the end of the 1990s when political agreements between the 
Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) and the FSLN were secured. 
                                                           
5 “Ley 147 sobre las personas jurídicas sin fines de lucro” (Law 147 On Non-Profit Associations).  
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3.3.  Hurricane Mitch: pushing for professionalized service delivery 
 
Hurricane Mitch, enormously hitting the country in 1998, entailed a turning point for 
civil society in Nicaragua. The hurricane drew in significant amounts of international aid relief for 
reconstruction. Donors, however, did not trust the then in office, quite corrupt President Arnoldo 
Alemán. Instead, they channeled most humanitarian relief via NGOs that possessed technical 
expertise and were active in the affected areas. These large sums of aid however posed a 
problem of absorptive capacity, introducing new coordination instruments, i.e. an umbrella 
organization “Coordinadora Civil de Emergencia y Reconstrucción” (Quiros 2006). This was 
Nicaragua’s first experience of establishing a non-hierarchical organ of coordination 
independent of political parties, church or government (Prado 2007). In this period, umbrella 
organizations became channels of international aid and service suppliers. Importantly, this 
natural disaster stimulated the elucidation of civil society capabilities and interests, earning them 
political, economic and public recognition. NGOS became “a central actor in the reconstruction 
process” (Boussard 2002:169). 
 




PRSPs, launched by the World Bank in 1999 were introduced under the Alemán 
presidency making Nicaragua one of the first countries to play according to the NAA rules.  As a 
soft conditionality, participation of CSO was incorporated in both PRSPs (2002 and 2005). It is 
worth noting that some of the central developments around PRSPS were the creation of the 
National Council for Social and Economic Planning (CONPES). Composed of representatives 
from CSOs, political parties and government, the council was in charge of advising the 
President of the Republic in the formulation and evaluation of economic and social plans, 
increasing transparency as well as reporting about different key issues of national interest. 
Although civil society-state relations were characterized by mutual accusations of failure to bring 
about democracy and development, a law on civic participation was approved (IADB 2006). The 
majority of the organizations we interviewed pointed out that, in spite of the permanent 
confrontation between the government and civil society, the law secured room for dialogue, 
political influence and participation. Not intended by the executive, resultant participation laws 
and CONPES led to the institutionalization of civil society participation (Borchgrevink 2006). 
However, some believed participation was still weak and ineffective despite various initiatives 
and parallel processes leading, among other things, to the publication of the document 




According to local studies and experts, Nicaraguan civil society experienced a 
proliferation of organizations carrying out a watchdog role and lobby activities during this period 
(Prado 2007).
  8  This was accompanied by extended access to political sphere.
9
                                                           
6 Presidencies: Arnaldo Alemán: 1998-2002;  Enrique Bolaños: 2002-2006. 
 CSOs also 
experienced increasing independence vis-à-vis the state and political parties. This process was 
7 Some organizations lamented the process was generally incoherent, limited to consultations and 
therefore lacking in-depth discussion of participation at the national level (SIDA 2004).  
8 Around 84% of CSOs in Nicaragua engage in lobbying activities (IADB 2006), a feature that is also 
confirmed by this study: all but one of the interviewed CSOs mentioned they were active in advocacy. This 
propensity towards lobbying can be explained, in part, by the fact that most of these organisations were 
founded to oppose neoliberal governments, many of them with a Sandinista background.  
9 To participate in CONPES, CSOs had to be able to engage with the government in policy formulation, i.e. 
health reform, food security law and economic and trade policies.   
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initiated by an internal division within the FSLN at the end of the 1990s urging traditional 
Sandinista organizations to distance themselves from the party. The interviews revealed this 
tendency had also to do with the donors approach and the NAA. According to the donors we 
interviewed, internal democratic structures are prerequisite for effective accountability. In fact, 
the main critique from donors and INGOs concerned was the weak internal democracy within 
CSOs, tensions between accountability to donors and downward accountability as well as a lack 
of monitoring capacities (both internal and towards the government). Despite the dearth of 
internal democracy and reforms towards more democratic structures, no one interviewed for the 
study has been able to combine both upward and downward accountability. The NGOs 
interviewed for the study, reported to be accountable to donors and depend economically on 
them. Yet, they are less accountable to beneficiaries and trustees. This lack of internal and 
external monitoring evidently jeopardizes CSOs efforts to legitimately hold government in check 
as well as be ready and open to the same scrutiny. 
 
There are also tensions between NGOs and member-based organizations. Some 
member-based organizations feel that NGOs have difficulties embracing a wider approach. An 
NGO leader admitted service delivery detracts them from other  roles leaving systematic 
exclusion and vulnerability unresolved. One leader from a movement also pointed to the ngo-
ization of civil society: too many organizations cannot fulfill democratic roles because these 
organizations do not have “optimal structures and capacity to carry out long term lobby actions” 
rather they are still too much based on short term project approach. Moreover, there seems still 
to be a natural and predominant attraction between donors and NGOs, even though a lot of 
them have problems in abandoning service delivery and moving towards preferred political roles 
by donors such as lobbying and advocacy. Movements on the other hand, which are by nature 
into lobbying and advocacy tend to have more trouble in attracting and dealing with donors.  
 
Although all interviewees lamented their limited impact on policy influencing and 
effectiveness in reporting corruptive behaviors, they highlighted that, during this period, room for 
participation was relatively open and institutionalized. Differences and tensions over their roles 
as service providers or watchdogs did not prevent articulation of interests and common actions 
within networks. Short-term coalitions and agreements on common concerns among sector 
organizations were secured resulting in certain levels of success thanks to, above all, the 
enabling environment of the NAA. Yet, effective, broad-based coalitions, crucial for political and 
social development, remained a major challenge.  
 
3.5.  The Ortega era: from politics to service delivery? 
 
The victory of the FSLN raised expectations among civil society actors, in particular 
among those with Sandinista roots. Tired of neoliberal governments implementing mainly donor-
driven PRSPs (Booth et al. 2006) and corruption scandals, they expected that things were going 
to change with the new administration that opposed neoliberalism. Anticipating more open 
governance, several NGO leaders affirmed their willingness to work with the Sandinistas. Yet, 
the current situation looks quite opposite to what had been expected, causing disillusion and 
disappointment and taking away hope of any possibility for real change and progress towards 
democracy and poverty reduction.  
 
The subsequent reinstatement of Ortega as president has slowed down and, some 
might say, even reversed democratic consolidation. According to the Freedom House report  
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(2008), the line between the state and the FSLN is increasingly blurred much like during the 
Sandinista era. Reforms taken have given more government control over the central bank, 
military and the police (ibid.). In addition, the present administration has been criticized for its 
way of dealing with citizens, encouraging clientelism, silencing opposition and using intimidation 
and violence (Perez Baltodano 2007). Current state-civil society relations, as seen by the 
interviewees, are conflictive and tense; the space for policy dialogue with the government has 
been relinquished from some organizations. The situation has been deteriorating steadily: civil 





Surprisingly, closing down of political space coincided with the formulation of the 
Human Development Plan (“Plan de Desarrollo Humano” 2008). This plan introduced some 
issues that formerly had been largely ignored in the development agenda, such as the 
promotion of fair trade and agriculture. As international aid for its implementation was required, 
the plan was presented at the Global Roundtable for receiving budget support. Although 
demanded by donors, CSOs participation was limited only to consultations in local level 
Citizens’ Power Councils  (“Consejos de Participación Ciudadana”) created by the present 
government. Our interviews showed a low participation of movements and NGOs due to their 
reluctance to support the current government. However, trade unions and worker’s associations 
were involved in the consultations. In fact, according to them, the government allowed a lot of 
“direct participation” involving citizens at the local level.  
 
A Freedom House report (2008) confirms that trade unions and worker’s 
organizations are controlled by the FSLN, and in turn by the government. As pointed out by a 
leader of a worker’s association, they are “aligned with the government” primarily because the 
government takes account their proposals into account in exchange of political support. But 
compensation seems to go farther than addressing CSO interests in the National Development 
Plan. The organizations admitted they carry out activities commissioned and funded by the 
government, e.g. food production project “Hambre 0” (Zero Hunger). Following the opinion of 
the same leader, civil society in Nicaragua is divided between those organizations that “worked 
with neoliberal governments” and those that “fight for an alternative”. Before Ortega, the 
common trend among CSOs was to keep off from political parties as well as state institutions, 
and seek alliances with CSOs; during the Ortega’s administration, however, CSOs have 
gradually been taking on political colors. The donors and nongovernmental organizations we 
have interviewed coincided that maintaining autonomy for organizations is increasingly difficult. 
The result is a context where civil society is riddled with a marked right-left division and within 
the left a cleavage between pro or against Ortega.  
 
Accountability, one of the main tenets under the NAA is difficult to exercise. 
Organizations that oppose the present government abound. These are umbrella organizations 
and movements with and without Sandinistas root but now also NGOs. Both the NAA incentives 
for improved government accountability and the risk of being co-opted by the government if they 
keep delivering services have pushed NGOs to increase monitoring and advocacy roles. With a 
                                                           
10 Therapeutic abortion was forbidden; nine women’s rights advocates have been subjected to criminal 
investigations as well as consequential intimidation by the authorities. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/10/28/nicaragua-protect-rights-advocates-harassment-and-intimidation 
(Last consulted July 28, 2010).  
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weak party system and parliament controlled by the president, vertical domestic accountability 
relies on CSOs by checking and balancing the state
11.  Additionally, the government has 
publicly threatened those that criticize its actions, report lack of transparency and 




However, Nicaraguan case shows that accountability is also prevented by the 
difficulties that CSOs have to get organized and find a common approach to face the situation.  
Nicaraguan CSOs seem to differ on how to address the present situation. Movements and 
umbrella organizations during the interviews indicated it is imperative to be belligerent when 
facing the undemocratic Ortega’s government regardless of potential legal prosecution. Aiming 
to augment government transparency, they have carried out different strikes and 
demonstrations, drawing in thousands of people against Ortega. Given the administration’s 
control over many CSOs, regime loyal organizations confronted mobilizations causing high 
levels of instability and violence on the streets as clashes ensued within divided segments of 
society.  
 
As one movement leader stressed it was a historical role endowed to such 
movements to oppose authoritarian regimes. Under the NAA and the shift within NGOs, they 
are also expected to fulfill the political roles so as to enhance democracy. So, movements 
expect and are willing to receive political and, above all, economic support from the NGO sector 
because the “real and sustainable solutions”, in their view, require a “political fight” and 
confrontation with the government rather to cooperation with or service delivery for government. 
Even though movements discourse has been downed played by NGOs jumping into the political 
arena, in the present context movements feel that both should strike up alliances and internally 
reinforce each other by pooling efforts and recourses. However, NGOs are not very comfortable 
with this approach. The interviewees were of the opinion that despite being part of networks 
jointly with movements and umbrella organizations, and carrying out lobbying and monitoring 
activities, NGOs prefer not to participate in mobilizations as it “is a demonstration of power”. 
Some are concerned about the attachment to political parties in organizing mobilizations even 
though such campaigns are directed against the ruling government. Instead, different strategies 
are preferred and, for instance, NGOs adopt less challenging positions detaching themselves 
from joining political mobilizations or expressing political support to any party or movement. In 
turn, voice and accountability efforts by NGOs, the most common organizations in Nicaraguan 
civil society, have become futile not only due to the weak role of NGOs in the past but also due 
to the risks attached to the present context finding themselves with low or no impact to improve 
governance and welfare. Consequently, the executive is weakly held accountable as CSOs are 
not able to find a common approach. 
 
The exit to this situation for NGOs and similar organizations seems to be a focus at 
local level where monitoring and delivering services have been gaining popularity. This 
tendency was very well reflected in the interviews with NGO leaders who explained they deliver 
services because funds to the government often disappear. Therefore, monitoring and lobby 
                                                           
11 As parties are very weak, parliament and parliamentary coalitions are also under FSLN control. 
12 Abolition of abortion law, regardless of health risks involved, has been considered a threat to human 
rights, not only by local organizations but also by Freedom House (2008) and Human Rights Watch 
(2008). However, leaders of one government-loyal organization claim civil society should be critical but not 
harmful to the government because they still receive funds from the latter, and therefore “they cannot go 
against” the executive. To a certain extent the incentives to hold government accountable become vain.  
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activities are less dangerous; they involve less political tension as the primary focus is on micro 
projects and micro policies that require less financing.   
 
Although a law on financing CSOs is in place, the government finances only 
“friendly” organizations. Moreover, budget support required readdressing aid channels and 
increasing conditions for CSOs finance. However, it seems that it is not an issue. NGOs have 
found other channels, such as INGOs, Northern philanthropic foundations, associations as well 
as donors not in line with NAA that provide with enough resources fit for their type of projects 
under less scrutiny and demands. Thus, NGOs may fail to engage with movements and other 
membership organizations to challenge the government and hold it accountable at the national 
level, to build alliances and demand political change but they seem to manage to survive.  
 
4.  DONOR SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER THE NAA AND POST-
NAA: PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE SOLUTION? 
 
The donors we interviewed agreed the Nicaraguan civil society is “fragmented” and 
“politicized”, therefore its capacities to effectively fulfill democratic functions are limited 
significantly. Against this backdrop, donors and INGOs created the “Fondo Común de Apoyo a 
la Sociedad Civil para la Gobernabilidad Democrática en Nicaragua” (Common Fund to Support 
Civil Society for Democratic Governance in Nicaragua)
13
 
. The fund supports governance 
projects by empowering CSOs to fulfill its democratic roles. With a set of single objectives and 
single contract procedures, Oxfam GB takes charge of the execution of this demand-driven 
fund. Mechanisms to promote alliance building and partnerships among CSOs are prerequisite 
to submit a project proposal. Open to all CSOs, the fund works mainly with NGOs. Before 
Ortega came to power, the fund financed different projects related to CSOs effectiveness on 
voice, lobbyism and accountability.  
At the time of the study (2008), the political space in the country was being 
intensively controlled, limiting the fund’s activities to broad consultations on the Human 
Development Plan (PDH). Among the interviewed fund members, there was no intention to do 
something else concerning CSOs support in spite of the political context and the difficulties of 
civil society to get organized. Important to note, the room for donors maneuver was also 
curtailed substantially. However, some months after the interviews, President Ortega attempted 
to close down the office of Oxfam GB, the managing institution of the fund and some donors 
stopped delivering budget support. Despite governmental pressures, the fund is still running 
with obvious constraints. 
 
Although the fund has been considered an innovative and advanced experience in 
harmonizing, coordinating and pooling efforts to support CSOs to enhance development and 
governance, experience shows that non context sensitive fund requirements such alliances and 
coalitions are not enough to reduce fragmentation. Apparently, CSOs find themselves “obliged 
to forge partnerships”, not for their common interest or identity, but rather for access to 
economic resources from donors. Leaders of small NGOs declared they did not want to get 
organized “just for money”, but instead they preferred to do so “for common interests”. CSOs, 
being financed or not, agreed the resulting alliances are “ad hoc” without a “common identity 
                                                           
13 Members: Oxfam Novib, SNV, Oxfam GB, Trocaire, COSUDE, Luxembourg Cooperation, DIFID, SIDA, 
Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands.  
Nicaraguan civil society caught in the pendulum's swing?  IOB Working Paper / 2010.10 - 21 -     
and goal” putting at risk the civil society’s endeavor to social change. Political action to promote 
social change or oppose governments, however, requires long term strategic and meaningful 
alliances while this type of alliances is in danger of becoming ”fragile” and “outdated” as some 
NGO and movement leaders concluded. It was also pointed out during our interviews that 
building so many alliances and networks might reduce plurality and diversity of CSOs. 
Additionally, for not running into conflict with the executive, donors decided not to finance 
registered CSOs. However, CSO registration in Nicaragua depends on support from pro-
government parliament members and organizations. Consequently, effective and well-organized 
organizations have difficulties to access funds. Thus, the fund does not reduce fragmentation. 
Contrary to this, some CSOs leaders assert, the fund seems to have fuelled tensions among 
CSOs, increasing “unfair competitiveness”, “dispersion” hampering mutual understanding. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS: WHY THE NAA IS NOT HELPFUL IN AN 
UNDEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
Throughout its history Nicaraguan civil society has shown that, notwithstanding the 
co-optive forces of political parties, it can play both democratic and developmental roles. Civil 
society formed a counterweight against Somoza and allied with the FSLN in order to remove 
him from the presidential position. Under the Sandinista regime, CSOs aligned with the state to 
implement development policies and contribute to the pro-poor agenda. Under neoliberal 
governments, civil society shifted into a watchdog by holding governments in check, taking the 
lead of channeling aid and, to a great extent, providing welfare at the margins of the state. 
When the NAA was introduced, civil society achieved important levels of autonomy vis-à-vis the 
state, increasing its activism in the political arena.  
 
In light of the present context, pressuring CSOs to fulfill democratic roles is 
troublesome and might undermine organizations’ potential for social change. According to a 
leader of a women’s movement, the roles of voice and accountability are feasible in democratic 
or relatively democratic environments. While these activities were possible to a certain degree 
under the Alemán presidency and even to a higher degree under the Bolaños government, they 
are now impossible under Ortega. Since the FSLN came to power, tensions have increased. It 
has become more and more difficult for civil society to get organized and build coalitions. As a 
result, accountability is inconceivable as the government threatens and oppresses any 
opposition. Free expression is only allowed to “friendly” organizations. Given these conditions, 
the only credible role for CSOs is either service delivery or confronting the state. However, the 
current trends show that organizations under government threat shy themselves away from 
political roles and, consequently, adjust to monitoring and/or delivering services at the local 
level. 
 
To create incentives for building alliances and set common objectives as donors 
also try to do may not be useful either. Although all the organizations we interviewed are part of 
an umbrella organization, network, federation or other types of coordinating structures, they are 
still fragmented. However, this is not surprising as after Ortega took over power, civil society 
has been failing to nurture social capital. In the words of one expert “although belonging to 
umbrella organizations and networks, CSOs are unable to articulate interests in a coordinated 
manner as they historically have been perceived fragmented and politically divided between left 
and right”. Thus, it is confirmed that under the current presidency, this division has been 
strikingly accentuated by a cleavage between supporters and opponents of President Ortega.   
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This case shows once more that civil society is not a homogenous entity, and 
organizations do not per se have common interests as they embrace different values and 
approaches to development (Bebbington et al. 2008; Mercer 2002). Moreover, civil society 
constitutes a “more problematic sphere” where interests of “both state and society” compete 
(Mercer 2002:11). Long-term effective coalitions and mutual understanding between umbrella 
organizations, movements and NGOs are difficult to achieve.  
 
In general, the NAA needs to attend more to sensitivity and realism in light of 
political contexts in developing countries. As evidenced in Nicaragua, imposing the single role of 
watchdog on civil society is ineffective and unrealistic as civil society has been playing and still 
can play different roles in different contexts. The NAA should not be treated as a rigid blueprint 
but, rather, as a guideline for implementation of reforms dependent on the given situation in the 
country of concern without undermining the diversity of roles and plurality of civil society 
organizations. It is essential, therefore, to be flexible with respect to certain 
conditions/requirements at different stages too. Stocktaking of good and bad practices and 
political economy analysis could lead to a better understanding of how and under what 
conditions actors of civil society can be the drivers of change in undemocratic contexts. In turn, 
this requires applying the NAA in a less technocratic way and donors recognizing the politics 
embedded within any development process when supporting partner countries. 
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ANNEX I: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CONPES: Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica y Social / National Council for Social 
and Economic Planning 
CSOs: Civil Society Organizations 
FSLN: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional / Sandinista National Liberation Front 
IADB: Inter-American Development Bank 
INGOs: International Non Governmental Organizations 
MDGs: Millennium Development and Goals 
NAA: New Aid Approach  
NGOs: Non Governmental Organizations 
PDH: Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Humano / Human Development Plan   
PLC: Partido Liberal Constitucionalista / Constitutionalist Liberal Party 
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
SAP: Structural Adjustment Policies 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
 
 
  
 
 